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Towards a gated community
Fear of (mass) migration has been and still is an important aspect of ongoing 
processes of socio-spatial bordering of immigrants within the European Union. The 
recent EU-enlargement involving several post-Soviet nations has only but 
intensified these sentiments. Offering an alternative to the well-known, yet flawed 
Fortress Europe metaphor, Henk van Houtum and Roos Pijpers argue that that the 
moral panic on immigration and consequent migration policy in various member 
states of the European Union follows a geo-strategic logic which much more than a 
Fortress resembles the management o f a Gated Community.
Introduction: ambivalent immigration policies
Over time, but especially since the opening of the internal market, the EU has 
"modernised" its immigration policy, specifically focussing on containing 
asylum migration, fighting irregular/illegal migration, and extending European 
migration policy onto the countries of origin and transit. Development aid is 
increasingly tied to agreements obligating these so-called third countries to 
take back "illegal" migrants and non-EU countries are increasingly being 
encouraged to control emigration from their countries more firmly. 
Furthermore, all non-EU countries on the edges of Europe are encouraged and 
financially sponsored to reinforce their border controls. The internal 
liberalisation of cross-border labour mobility and moral equality for "all" 
EU-citizens in the internal market is thus combined with transitory measures 
with regard to freedom of movement of the Union's newest inhabitants and the 
tightening of control and management efforts at the new external borders. This 
renewed border regime has led to an increased closing, fortifying and policing 
of the borders of the European Union, even to the point where the attempts to 
remain unseen or escape from the hunt and chase by border guards leads to the 
death of would-be immigrants (see also Harris, 2002). The defence policy of 
the European Union is apparently willing to go as far as making the external 
border a literal deadline by criminalising the lives of refuges who are trying to
Living is easy with eyes closed 
Misunderstanding all you see 
Nothing is real and nothing to get hungabout 
Strawberry Fields forever
The Beatles, 1967
Such a pretty house 
Such a pretty garden 
No alarms and no surprises 
Please 
Radiohead, 1997
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find work or shelter in the European Union. Hideously, the deaths are 
implicitly seen as the "collateral damage" of the combat against illegal 
migrants. Estimates of deaths at the borders differ, but many would agree that 
it is somewhere in the thousands now. At the same time however, and in sharp 
contrast with this policy of closing the external border for immigrants from 
outside the EU, strategically selective political measures are being processed, 
focusing on the attraction of specific labour forces from outside the EU 
countries in order to bypass labour shortages in certain segments of the 
economy. It is this highly under-exposed policy contrast that we wish to 
analyse in more detail and spread light upon in this essay.
The desire for bordermanagement
We believe that the key term to connect and enlighten the above pictured 
increasingly paradoxical bifurcated EU-policy is desire. What we see is first 
of all a continuous and strong desire for a sovereign and autonomous control of 
what are seen as 'redundant fortune seekers'. Hence, here the desire expresses 
itself as a wish to control the numbers of the 'redundant' and allegedly difficult 
to integrate 'non-western' immigrants/refugees in order to preserve the social 
cohesion within the (national) borders. Secondly, there is an increasing desire 
to selectively acquire non-EU citizens outside the domain of the EU in order 
to protect the own economic welfare in the future (Van Houtum, 2003). Often 
still implicit, but increasingly outspoken, this desire for more labour 
immigration exists because of population-, knowledge- and skill-specific 
shortages on the European labour markets. Although these two forms of desire 
are intrinsically contrasting and are incredibly difficult to sustain in 
combination, let alone manage, both desirability and undesirability of 
immigration are means to the same end, that is to protect the own internal 
comfort zone (Van Houtum, 2003).
In general, the desire to control, to manage the borders of opening and closure 
could be considered as the inverse of fear. This fear has many faces.
Sometimes it shows itself as a fear for the other, fear for the unknown, the 
stranger, and is associated with the fear to lose the self-defined social identity 
and the preciously constructed feeling to fit in a certain territorial community. 
In other instances, the face of fear is material, concern or worry to lose one's 
job or the fear of decreasing national welfare and social funds. Despite the 
multiplicity of its faces, fear of immigrants is generally not grounded in a 
thorough knowledge of current EU-realities, such as its lagging market 
competitiveness vis-à-vis more efficient (the US, Japan) or cheaper (China, 
India) producers, its enlargement process and the geo-economic configuration 
of its new member states. As subsequent Eurobarometer reports demonstrate, 
advocates for as well as opponents to enlargement share the opinion that the 
accession of candidate member countries into the European Union will 
negatively affect their home country employment situation1. The majority of 
the survey respondents is however unable to name even three applicant 
member states. Information deficiencies about EU realities thereby seem to 
reinforce current migration discourses dominated by dissatisfaction about 
immigrant and minority integration in the recent past. In this way, mental 
difference is reproduced and sustained between "us Europeans" and "them, 
non-Europeans" (Van Houtum, 2003). an illustration of this is that in the 
process of EU-enlargement, almost all "old" member states of the EU have 
decided to install a post-entry transition phase or different kind of delaying 
measure for entry of low-rated labourers. The actual incorporation of future 
EU members into the Schengen zone has not materialised with accession, but 
will do so in subsequent stages through the making of a cordon sanitaire. Also
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known as "bufferzone politics", the new bordermanagement takes place not 
only at border locations proper, but also at country-internal locations such as 
airports and asylum centres. A telling example of this bordermanagement 
relates to the highly controversial "detention centres" recently installed in the 
Netherlands, destined to efficiently conduct expelling procedures of rejected 
asylum seekers and caught undocumented migrant workers, many from 
EU-associated countries such as Romania, Bulgaria and even Ukraine.
Moral panic in the EU
The fear of massive flows of east-west migrants after EU-enlargement, 
embedded in a broader context of "negative" migration discourses, fits well in 
this series of examples as the recurring argument here is that there is a general 
and continuous desire to confront the normal with the deviant and the self with 
the Other. The Other is "utilised" to compare with, associate with or to oppose 
to (see also Sibley, 2001, Derrida, 1973, Luhmann, 1985). Without others there 
is no need to have a social identity (see also Jenkins, 1996), for it is only in the 
awareness of imaginative Others that it becomes a relevant and contingent 
source of meaning and experience. This negative conception of social identity 
resonates with Bauman's argument that "each order has its disorder and each 
purity its own dirties" and Sibley's well-known notion of "purification of 
space" (Bauman, 1997, Sibley, 1995, 2001). By definition therefore, a border 
deconstructs a difference (the outside in and/or the inside out) but at the same 
time creates a difference (a new outside). Yet, the function of b/ordering is 
precisely that: the making of a divisive order in an assumed chaos. It is 
justified to neglect and be indifferent to what is beyond the border (Van 
Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). A spatial imaginative bordering process 
accordingly rests upon the redefinition of friends as natives (Bauman, 1990), 
among whom common assets of knowledge and wealth are constructed and 
distributed (Giddens, 1984). To strangers, residential rights are granted only if 
such an extension of rights is desirable (though desirability is often disguised 
as "feasibility") (Bauman, 1990). The identity of strangers is therefore usually 
not their own choice (see also Bradley, 1997, Miller, 1995). They are excluded 
on the basis of their other or absent nationality (country of birth, colour, creed 
or culture) and must adjust to the new one if they wish to be included. Each 
society then, as Bauman famously argued, "produces its own kind of strangers" 
(Bauman, 1997, p.17).
Depending on the circumstances in individual member states, this desire has 
found new socio-political outlets and performances, thereby often creating a 
new, normative vocabulary. In the present case, it could be argued, that the 
pressing and even disciplining discourse on the need to communify -  
expressed in terms like "common market", "internal market", "a borderless 
Europe" and "the need for European citizenship" -  has invoked a certain state 
of "abnormality", portrayed by people living outside the EU and non-EU 
refugees seeking shelter inside the Union. The consequence is an increased 
anxiety and fear of the Other, or in the words of Sibley a moral panic, which in 
his view concern contested spaces, liminal zones which hostile communities 
intend on eliminating by appropriating such spaces for themselves and 
excluding the offending "other" (Sibley, 1995, p. 39). Attempting to make such 
a categorical difference between EU - and non-EU-citizens, yet also wishing 
to stay politically correct, there has been continous attempts to appropriately 
define and term the non-insiders, the people from outside the EU. Many terms 
are used: strangers, aliens, foreigners, newcomers, (im)migrants, refugees and 
the Dutch term "allochtonen"2, to name but a few. As it defines a border 
between normality and deviance, the defining, making and exclusion of the
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Other is, as Sibley calls it, a "colonisation" of social life. The colonisation is a 
way of making difference (through the use of social space) beyond the border 
and of rejecting difference within the bordered.
Fortress Europe?
There is no shortage of normative stands on this exclusion of Others by the 
EU. Walzer (1983), for instance, provocatively states that communities should 
not be allowed to make a claim of territorial jurisdiction and rule over the 
people with whom they share a territory. He argues that, although admission 
and exclusion are at the core of communal independence, the rule of citizens 
over non-citizens and members over strangers is "an act of tyranny". Seyla 
Benhabib, following Derrida's essay on hospitality in her plea for "interactive 
universalism", is also with him on this point (Derrida, 1973; Benhabib, 1996). 
For, she asks, what is the ethical difference between the right to leave a 
democratic country (since in democratic societies citizens are not prisoners) 
and the right for others to enter? Following this line of argument, the 
inhabitants of the "chaos" outside the insulating Union, are the new barbarians 
from a world outside, undesired and hence denied access. It is no wonder, then, 
that the European Union to many resembles a fortress (or a maze or sieve to 
others who regard the EU's fortification efforts alongside its external borders 
as bound to fail due to lack of funds/equipment/competence) where 
unwelcoming and even hostile visualisations of closure abound (see also 
Kramsch et al., 2004).
However, we would argue that this picture of Fortress Europe, besides its all 
too dramatic ring and its geographic incorrectness (it is the European Union 
one talks about, not Europe), is also increasingly untenable. The foregoing 
measures against unsolicited redundancy and people dying at the gates of the 
EU, a picture that would fit in the image of a fortress, sharply contrast with 
policy with regard to economically desirable, scarce forms of labour. Since 
many (western) European nations are increasingly coping with shortages of 
specific (academic) knowledge or skills, economic demand for foreign experts 
in possession of such knowledge is often made explicit in visa, work and 
residence permits granted to migrant workers from outside the EU. For this 
reason, politicians in several countries have started a discussion to introduce 
Green Cards (Germany), work permits (Great Britain), quota (Italy) and a 
speed-office (The Netherlands) enabling desired foreign employees to bypass 
bureaucratic immigration procedures. Top managers, engineers, PhD-students 
and talented soccer players from third countries can all be strategically selected 
by non-state actors such as large firms, universities and specialised 
employment agencies. In the case of new EU-member states, medium- and to 
a lesser extent low-skilled employees such as nurses and seasonal workers in 
agriculture or construction may occasionally be granted access as well. The 
bufferzone politics described above will not apply for this limited group of 
east-west migrants. In contrast with the "anti-redundancy" and "anti-burden" 
politics applying to the many, a few are seen as valuable "assets", who are 
most welcome on the European internal market. Furthermore, a growing 
number of reports produced by supranational organisations suggest that a 
future softening of immigration and border policies will be unavoidable in 
present EU-member states, since the absolute decline of active work forces 
will only but continue in the next decades (see also Sassen, 2002). A further 
factor, until recently largely overlooked in community migration discourses, is 
that the European Commission has acknowledged the need for what is called 
replacement immigration in the not-so-distant future in its 2000 
communication brief "On a Community Immigration Policy", herewith once
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more strengthening its ambivalent views on migration (European Commission, 
2000). Although recognised by individual member states, the unavoidable need 
for more immigration in the nearby future (if the sustainability of EU-market 
competitiveness is considered important) does not seem to alter much in 
short-sighted restrictive migration policies enforced at the moment.
Such strategically selective and exclusionary socio-spatial bordering processes 
of migration can be explained as a result of the globalised capitalist economy, 
the far-reaching influence of which the European internal market has not been 
able to escape (fortified or not). In one of her earlier analyses on the subject, 
Saskia Sassen writes:
national boundaries do not act as barriers so much as 
mechanisms reproducing the system through the international 
division of labor. [...] The enforcement of national borders 
contributes to the existence of a large number of countries in 
the form of a periphery and the designation of its workers as a 
labor reserve for global capital. Border enforcement is a 
mechanism facilitating the extraction of cheap labor by 
assigning criminal status to a segment of the working class -  
illegal immigrants. Foreign workers undermine a nation's 
working class when the state renders foreigners socially and 
politically powerless. At the same time, border enforcement 
meets the demands of organised labor in the labor-receiving 
country insofar as it presumes to protect native workers. Yet 
selective enforcement of policies can circumvent general 
border policies and protect the interests of economic sectors 
relying on immigrant labor (Sassen, 1988, pp. 36-37).
A wide range of interpretations and assessments exist of these developments, 
firmly rejected by some, cautiously welcomed by others. The general approach 
towards the associated notion of neo-liberalism, which stands for 
policy-making commitments to free trade, privatisation and deregulation, and 
has become the dominant political common sense of our time and as such also 
informs our migration policies, is largely negative. Originated in leftist 
anti-globalisation movements, the term neo-liberalism is almost synonymous 
with exploitation (of labour) (see for instance Sparke, 2002). Favell and 
Hansen, on the other hand, provocatively argue that market-driven strategic 
selectivity is irrevocably becoming a major determinant of migration flows in 
an enlarging European Union. In their view, "normative" Fortress Europe is 
quite open in "positivist" reality, both for economic migrants (through strategic 
selectivity) and asylum seekers (through highly inefficient and ambivalent 
asylum procedures) (Favell and Hansen, 2002). "The idea of Europe" would, 
accordingly, benefit greatly from the drawing of a much clearer line between 
economic migration and asylum. A similar, yet more fundamental assessment 
is provided by Slavoj Zizek, who, through his idea of "post-politics", calls 
attention to the de-politicisation of European politics as he sees it (Zizek,
1998, see also Van Houtum and Van Naerssen, 2002). Post-politics goes 
beyond ideological differences between left and right to explain the 
irreversible expansion of global capitalism as consensus politics, wherein 
universal social issues such as transnational migration are reduced to mere 
administrative procedures (Zizek, 1998 and 2002). From an initiator of radical 
changes in the world order, politics turns into an end-user of manoeuvring 
space within existing parameters. In this respect, the Comaroffs go as far as to 
argue that by hiding its own ideological underpinnings in the dictates of 
economic efficiency and efficacy, politics portends its own death (Comaroff
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and Comaroff, 2002).
The European Union as a Gated Community
So, what is left of the Fortress Europe rhetoric when selective access of 
desirable immigrants is considered? The border is economically closed for an 
overwhelming majority, yet open for some. To understand and better grasp 
these paradoxical border policies we have to ask ourselves what exactly is it 
then that we are trying to protect in the EU? In economic terms, protection 
principally concerns comfort, which is an (economic) interpretation and 
extension of the concept of "easiness"3. Thus, the interpretation of the border 
in economic terms focus on the degree of protection of the national economy, 
of "our national interest". The latter interest is an issue of appropriating and 
justifying comfort. A territorial border from an economic point of view is 
hence a form of territorialisation of wealth stocks and potentials. The chances 
for strangers to be allowed to play a role in the national economic arena are 
higher when estimated national wealth and employment effects of them 
entering are net-positive. In its rather opportunistic search of inputs in order to 
maximise competitive advantage, the EU actively seals off specific domains of 
the economy for and at the expense of others. Probably the best-known 
example of this is the agricultural sector, which, in most of the member states, 
is unable to compete with efficient large-scale production elsewhere. Instead 
of letting "the market" prevail here, as neo-classical ideology would be in 
favour of, highly protectionist policies (import tariffs, export subsidies) 
prevent agricultural goods from outside from penetrating European Union 
space. This is quite similar, we would suggest, to the current migration policies 
in the enlarging European Union, which protect the comfort of job security in a 
highly inflexible labour market and in a number of highly uncompetitive 
economic sectors. By denying outsiders access to domestic labour markets, the 
EU protects its domestic workers through border enforcement and (expensive) 
work and residence permits. The sustenance of comfort, the amount of money 
and/or (the growth of) wealth gained is hence a form of collective self-interest 
of the community of human beings who call each other "members" of the EU.
Hence, much more than a fortress, the European Union is beginning to look 
like a "gated community". A gated community, also referred to as "defended 
neighbourhood", is a form of housing found mainly in developing countries 
with large internal income differences such as Mexico, Brazil and Venezuela, 
as well as the United States. In gated communities, the affluent gate 
themselves off from the rest of society in an enclave, primarily driven by fear 
(of crime) and the need for welfare protection and security. In a recent 
excellent empirical overview, Blandy et al. (2003) adopted the following 
definition of gated communities:
walled or fenced housing developments to which public access 
is restricted, often guarded using CCTV4 and/or security 
personnel, and usually characterised by legal agreements 
(tenancy or leasehold) which tie the residents to a common 
code of conduct (Blandy et al., 2003, p.2).
Gated communities express a clear-cut form of socio-spatial insolidarity, of 
the purification of space, by shutting the gates for the "outside" world under 
the flag of privacy, comfort and security. Non-members, usually the non-rich, 
are excluded from these spatially bordered contractual associations. A gated 
community is a kind of frontierland that is predominantly privately built and 
maintained. Membership is paid for and non-members are labelled guests. The
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gates of the gated community are not only a result of the desire to produce a 
space for the outsider, the stranger, but even more so, a purified space for the 
insider. It is the commercialisation of fear. It does not come as a surprise then, 
that the identity of the members in these communities is marketed as a 
life-style, as a status that you buy. Take for instance the example of one of the 
most widely boasted examples of a gated community world-wide: Palm 
Island. This artificially constructed island (in the shape of a palm tree) located 
just offshore of the city of Dubai is on the verge of completion, providing a 
haven of luxury to those able to afford its villas and apartments. A visit to the 
web-site of Palm Island learns:
Welcome to a place like no other / A unique island experience /
Ocean views and tranquil waters / Luxury properties starting at 
$275,000 / The Palm's horizons will forever change yours 
(www.palmsales.ca).
Strawberry fields-like gated unities such as Palm Island are remarkably similar 
to the ideology of the European Union in its accommodation of wealth and its 
resistant, antagonistic and hostile practices to the mobile Other, especially the 
deprived ones such as fugitives, gypsies, immigrants, vagrants, and travellers 
(Urry, 2000). Much like a gated community, the EU is constructed to control, 
monitor and manage its borders and thereby safeguard those who are in from 
those who are out. New members of the European club are sought after if they 
are attractive to the upgrading or sustenance of welfare, others are preferably 
stopped at the gates. Another group of people, unidentified yet of considerable 
size, slips through the maze, often with the help of human traffickers: they are 
the undocumented who clean and cater the gated community.
Strawberry fields forever?
Looking at the present geo-political landscape in Europe, it can be ascertained 
that, notwithstanding the postmodern calls for and local celebrations of 
heterotopia, the making and marking of borders and thereby processes of social 
exclusion have not dissolved in the European Union as a whole. A wall of 
conservative solidification is being erected that is increasingly fierce and 
terrifying, yet it also contains neo-liberal mazes and conscious blindness for 
specific (illegal) labour forces that help to sustain the easiness and comfort. 
This neo-conservative b/ordering practice that increasingly fits the description 
of a gated community, reinforces capitalist state-centric logic to the 
disadvantage of attempts to transgress neo-liberal containment. Gated 
communities are a kind of never-neverland in the sense that the dream of 
purity and easiness is neverending -  for by definition, human desire is 
perpetual. Furthermore, it is a kind of strawberry fields-politics inside and 
cherry-picking outside the EU -  something which is increasingly untenable 
from a normative point of view. We would suggest that, when issues such as 
future EU-enlargement rounds remain controversial, or, as is the case with the 
Union's "model of governance", hardly discussed at all (see for instance 
Kramsch et al., 2004), decision-making in the field of immigration is ready for 
an attempt to turn the present European external bordermanagement 
upside-down. This does not mean a further intensification of migration 
policies in terms of administrative capacities and logistic support, but a return 
to a policy of solidarity that has an open eye for the people beyond the narrow 
strawberry fields of the European Union.
This article is based on a paper presented at the Border Regions in Transition: 
Vth International Conference, Hungary, September 2003; new version for
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